Spare a thought for the Fed. The hope that inflation had peaked in March was brutally dashed last week as headline inflation printed a new high, of 8.6%. A 50bp rate hike this month is now all but certain, with many forecasters looking for 75bp. We could also spare a thought for the BoE. The Old Lady told markets last time in convened that it expects inflation to rise above 10% by Q4, that the economy could well fall into recession, but that it will continue hiking anyway. Or maybe, we should spare a thought for the ECB. Last week, Ms. Lagarde informed investors that the central bank intends to raise rates by 50bp, at least, between now and September, followed by a "sustained and gradual" rate hikes. Yields and spreads rose on the day, likely more than the ECB would have expected, let alone liked, and the euro weakened. The central bank we shouldn't spare a thought for, however, is the BOJ, apparently.
Read MoreI’ll keep it short this week, mainly because I don’t have much new to say. I continue to think that the tug-of-war between markets and monetary policymakers in fixed income markets remains the key spectacle to watch, even if I concede that we have been watching it for a while. There are economists and strategists who will tell you that policymakers are perfectly happy with steepening yield curves, and that they in fact welcome them. To believe this, however, requires that you forget the initial stages of the pandemic-policy response in which central bankers solemnly pledged to print as much money as needed—via QE—to keep rates pinned across all maturities in order to support the monumental fiscal efforts needed to prevent economic disaster. If you’re telling me that this tacit agreement is now broken on the eve of the new US administration is about to shovel €1.9T into an almost fully vaccinated economy—that’s just shy of 10% of GDP for those wondering—I have to concede that yields can, and likely will, move a lot higher. But is that really what you’re telling me? It seems to me that observers have quietly pivoted towards the idea that central banks obviously accept, even want, higher bond yields to reflect the recovery. I am sorry, but that doesn’t pass the smell test. While a steepening yield curve sows the seeds of its own destruction via an ever more attractive roll and carry, especially with fwd guidance on the front end, there is always a risk that markets end up questing the commitment to low policy rates.
Read MoreJudging by the latest virus numbers in Europe, and government announcements to contain it, markets may soon have to read up on the math of lockdown economics. Before we get to that, though, investors have been locked in deep thought over the impact of the U.S. presidential elections, which seems to converge on trying to price in the consequences of a Biden victory and a “blue wave”. As I explained last week, investors seem to have concluded that this is good outcome for risk assets, though as I argued at the time, this isn’t entirely clear to me. To illuminate this further, it’s useful to consider how markets perceive a Blue wave in the context of the dollar and the U.S. bond market. As it turns out, the consensus position isn’t entirely clear, which is a hint. If markets can’t figure out how a Democratic sweep will impact the dollar and bonds, it’s difficult to have any view on how it would impact equities. The dollar is particularly interesting. It seems to me that analysts initially pinned recent weakness—effectively since April—on the inherent political risks associated with a Biden presidency, though it has since morphed into a bullish catalyst in the context of the expectation of surge in fiscal stimulus, funded by a benevolent and compliant Fed. Why this latter should necessarily be bearish for the dollar isn’t clear to me, especially not if it led to stronger growth in the U.S. compared to the rest of the world. By contrast, the idea, voiced in some corners of the market, that the U.S. is on its way to print away its exorbitant privilege—in effect losing its reserve currency status—seems even more ludicrous to me, even in world where China is now emerging as a potential adversary.
Read MoreThe jury is still out, but I reckon that last week’s price action provided a foundation for markets to finally get an answer to the question that’s on everyone’s mind. The sustained climb in equities, and precipitous decline in the dollar, are interesting in their own right, but am keeping my eyes on the US bond market. The long bonds sold off steadily through the week, a move that culminated with Friday’s curveball of a NFP report—payrolls rose by 2.5M breezing past the consensus of a 7.5M fall—and a further leap in yields. All told, the US 10y rose by almost 30bp last week, to just under 0.9%, and with the front-end more-or-less locked, the 2s10s and 2s5s steepened to 70bp and 30bp, respectively, which is the widest since early 2018. A closer look at the chart won’t really raise any eyebrows. Sure, the curve is steepening, but it’s not like the move is unprecedented, and the curve is still overall quite flat. In the present context, however, last week’s move is a clarion call to the Fed. Will they allow (long-end) bond yields to reflect the deluge of debt issuance, and associated economic rebound, or will they, as some have suggested, put the Treasury market on a “war footing” via a yield cap? In other words, it’s do or die for the decision on yield curve control. Of course, that’s not entirely true. The Fed has been waffling on this issue for ages, and there is no guarantee that they won’t continue to do just that. That said, I have to say that last week’s squeeze in bonds offers a very tasty and clear setup for this week’s FOMC meeting. Will the Fed let long yields run or will they put a lid on them, either verbally, or via an outright YCC announcement?
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