Remember the Deal

I’ll keep it short this week, mainly because I don’t have much new to say. I continue to think that the tug-of-war between markets and monetary policymakers in fixed income markets remains the key spectacle to watch, even if I concede that we have been watching it for a while. There are economists and strategists who will tell you that policymakers are perfectly happy with steepening yield curves, and that they in fact welcome them. To believe this, however, requires that you forget the initial stages of the pandemic-policy response in which central bankers solemnly pledged to print as much money as needed—via QE—to keep rates pinned across all maturities in order to support the monumental fiscal efforts needed to prevent economic disaster. If you’re telling me that this tacit agreement is now broken on the eve of the new US administration is about to shovel €1.9T into an almost fully vaccinated economy—that’s just shy of 10% of GDP for those wondering—I have to concede that yields can, and likely will, move a lot higher. But is that really what you’re telling me? It seems to me that observers have quietly pivoted towards the idea that central banks obviously accept, even want, higher bond yields to reflect the recovery. I am sorry, but that doesn’t pass the smell test. While a steepening yield curve sows the seeds of its own destruction via an ever more attractive roll and carry, especially with fwd guidance on the front end, there is always a risk that markets end up questing the commitment to low policy rates.

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