Sometimes in markets, everyone looks up the same price in the morning to get a feeling of where sentiment is. It’s often one of the big ones; the S&P 500, the long bond, the price of oil, DXY, or gold, or even Bitcoin. Recently, everyone has been following the bloodbath in short-term interest rate markets as implied rates in one developed market after the other have gone haywire. Things have settled down slightly in the past week following the FOMC meeting, and the hilarious unch-BOE decision in the face of a near-certainty of a rate hike only a few weeks ago. I reckon implied rates will fall a bit further in the near term. The U.S. 2y, for instance, seems like it wants to go down before it’ll try to snap back, implying that the violent decline in short-term interest rate futures—though not necessarily those for 2022—should ease a bit too. But it is difficult to escape the feeling that the genie is out the bottle. Expectations have shifted, and while central banks won’t have to meet them as priced, they will have to deliver something.
Read MoreThe chancellor of the Exchequer had sobering news for the UK public last month when he unveiled that the Treasury is on track to borrow almost 20% of GDP this year to plug the hole in the economy created by the virus, a move that will see the public debt-to-GDP ratio zoom past 100%. In a world governed by the rules of the now-defunct work by Rogoff and Reinhart—famously discredited by a spreadsheet error—these numbers would send chills down the spine of economists and public policymakers, but we’ve moved from on then, significantly. We now understand that the government does not operate under a budget constraint, and that it can, in fact, create as much (sovereign) money it wants to buy as much debt that it wishes to issue—via primary market purchases by the central bank—to finance whatever level of spending and investment—ostensibly to generate jobs for every able man and woman—that it wants. I treated these issues in a long-form essay on fiscal policy, but the elevator pitch is simple enough. Under the auspice of MMT, governments have the ability and duty to create jobs for everyone and to prevent financial and economic distress and harm. It must do so because the economic costs and constraints hitherto associated with such a policy strategy are figments of Neo-Classical economists’ imagination.
Read MoreIt has been clear for a while that Covid-19 would be a big shock to the global economy, but early predictions of a quick rebound, and a return to normal, now look fanciful. I am now inclined to believe that just about everything will change. My old colleague, and good friend, Jonathan Tepper is musing on a similar note in a recent piece on Unherd.com. I recommend that you go read it; it’s a great piece. For my part, I’ll split my arguments into two observations, not necessarily market-related, but both are key to understand the evolution of markets and the economy in the next few quarters, and I would suggest, beyond as well. We are not even through the first quarter yet, but it’s fair to say that the first chart on my next page already is the chart of the year. It portrays the “optimal” strategy to combat the virus relative to doing nothing, and a policy of loose mitigation. Leaving the Chinese and South Korean outbreaks aside—as well as the grim disaster unfolding in Iran—I think it’s fair to make two overall points. Firstly, there has been a significant debate about the correct strategy to combat the virus. The responses have been scattered on a spectrum ranging from (unconfirmed?) pictures of Chinese authorities welding doors shut to apartment blocks to halt the spread, over to “herd immunity”. Or, as former SAS soldier Ant Middleton’s suggests; “fuck Covid-19”, a statement that he, in fairness, has now retracted.
Read MoreI promise that I will not do an explainer of the VIX this week. Instead, I will lead with some observations on markets and finish with a war-story from the world of retail investing. The return of equity volatility has engendered two responses. Firstly, it seemed as if investors breathed a sigh of relief on Monday when it became clear that we could peg the swoon to the blow-up of short-vol ETFs and related strategies. It is always scary when markest fall out of bed, and even more if so if we can’t explain why. Blaming excessive risk-taking in short-vol strategies assured that the sell-off, while painful, would be short. Secondly, every strategist note that I have subsequently read—and comments from policymakers—have echoed this sentiment. A sell-off was long overdue and is perfectly normal. There is nothing to worry about, and underlying economic fundamentals for risk assets remain robust. Many have even welcomed the volatility as a sign of healthy markets. I have no particular reason to disagree, but my spider sense tingles when investors and strategists welcome a 10% puke in equities. I understand that macro traders are excited but real money and long-only? The logical response from markets would seem to be: “Oh, so you think you’re tough?”
Read More