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The fertility wars

The political flurry in the US over the virtues of parenthood and a high birth rate is part of a much larger cultural moment in which the debate on the significance of falling global fertility is pitting two increasingly militant and unyielding sides against each other. We have trade wars, culture wars, even actual wars; we can now add fertility wars to the list. When Elon Musk, a US entrepreneur and businessman, calls Ms. Harris an “extinctionist”, because she has linked the reluctance of young people to have children to “climate anxiety”, he means it, just as he means it when he concludes that “the natural extension of her philosophy would be a de facto holocaust for all of humanity!”

How to get handle on this? With difficulty, but in the end, hopefully with precision and clarity. First, I will briefly show that the fertility wars have been fought for a long time. I will then draw the contours of three separate positions in the fertility wars today—on the Conservative right, on the left, and a feminist perspective—before offering a suggestion on where this discourse goes next, and where it ultimately ends up, if we are sufficiently unlucky or un-attentive.

Things to think about #5

There’s been a lot of talk about the political center* in Europe in the past few weeks, in the wake of the French parliamentary elections and the landslide victory for Labour in the UK. Is it reinvigorated, complacent, or perhaps just lucky? I offer two thoughts on this.

Firstly, sometimes a long-in-the-tooth incumbent is sacrificed on the altar of change no matter how reasonable or uncontroversial he or she is. In the context the most recent elections in Europe, this applies mostly to France, where the people has a tendency to throw their leaders under the bus, for no other reason that they’ve been in power for a bit too long. But I think it applies to England too, to an extent. Rishi Sunak and his cabinet weren’t that bad, or more specifically, the Sunak government was a lot of less controversial and risk-seeking than its Tory predecessors. But in the end, the weight of dissatisfaction and disillusion with previous iterations of Conservative cabinets were too much to bear. The Tories received the drubbing they deserved, having put their faith in a toxic mix of volatility and incompetence under Boris Johnson and Liz Truss. The doomed political and economic project of Brexit looms large in this story too. Whatever Labour decides to do with this smelling carcass of a political legacy, it brought the destruction of the Conservative party, and the right in UK politics, as we know it. Perhaps for that reason, Starmer will be inclined to leave it smelling for a bit longer, to remind people of what they’ll get should they consider jumping back into the Tory fold.

Things to think about #4

The Economist’s Free Exchange column drops in on the question of an economic motherhood penalty from childbirth. It is nice to see that the Economist correctly distinguishes between two distinct economic motherhood penalties, both of which can be traced to the interplay between evolutionary forces and modernity, where the latter in this case is defined as an environment with rapidly increasing returns to investment in human capital and education. The first, between fathers and mothers, emerge because the cost of child-rearing especially in the early part of a child’s life overwhelmingly falls on the mother, a conclusion which follows from Trivers (1972). This is true in terms of the cost during pregnancy and immediately after too. It is also true before we consider the possibility that the resource allocation trade-off for many women shifts in the wake of motherhood. The second motherhood penalty occurs between women. Put simply, in an economic structure where childless women have the ability to devote all their resources to somatic investment and take advantage of the above-mentioned increasing returns to human capital investment, the wage and wealth divergence between women who have many children and those who have none will widen significantly, at least in theory. For more on this, I cover the theory in more detail in my essay on fertility and sexual selection; see here.

Things to think about #3

Last week, the leasehold and reform bill became law in the UK. This is not the end of leasehold reform. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning. This passage of the bill happened against the odds. It was crawling through parliament and when Rishi Sunak, somewhat unexpectedly, announced the general election on July the 4th, campaigners for leasehold reform—a group which yours truly have been loosely working with for a while—thought the bill would be lost. If you want to understand what happens to outstanding bills in the brief final sessions of parliament before prorogation, you need to read to up on something called wash-up. Put simply, it’s the period where outstanding bills are either rammed through as is, or kicked into the abyss never to be seen again. It is a borderline insane policy process, which breaks all the rules of legislation, simply to get the order book emptied as quickly as possible. The leasehold and reform bill made it, just, though without key additions such as a cap on ground rent or a ban on forfeiture. This is bitterly disappointing, especially in case of the former given that an agreement to cap ground rents to £250 pa was virtually agreed by the department and HMT, or so we’re told. But I guess we live to fight another day rather than having to start over.

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